Algorithmic Game Theory Solution concepts in games Part I

Georgios Birmpas birbas@diag.uniroma1.it

Based on slides by Vangelis Markakis and Alexandros Voudouris

Solution concepts

Choosing a strategy...

- Given a game, how should a player choose his strategy?
 - Recall: we assume each player knows the other players' preferences but not what the other players will choose
- The most fundamental question of game theory
 - Clearly, the answer is not always clear
- We will start with 2-player games

Prisoner's Dilemma: The Rational Outcome

- Let's revisit prisoner's dilemma
- Reasoning of pl. 1:
 - If pl. 2 does not confess, then
 I should confess
 - If pl. 2 confesses, thenI should also confess
- Similarly for pl. 2
- Expected outcome for rational players: they will both confess, and they will go to jail for 3 years each
 - Observation: If they had both chosen not to confess, they would go to jail only for 1 year, each of them would have a strictly better utility

	С	D
С	3, 3	0, 4
D	4, 0	1, 1

Dominant strategies

- Ideally, we would like a strategy that would provide the best possible outcome, regardless of what other players choose
- <u>Definition</u>: A strategy s_i of pl. 1 is *dominant* if $u_1(s_i, t_j) \ge u_1(s', t_j)$

for every strategy $s' \in S^1$ and every strategy $t_j \in S^2$

• Similarly for pl. 2, a strategy t_i is dominant if

 $u_2(s_i, t_j) \ge u_2(s_i, t')$

for every strategy $t' \in S^2$ and for every strategy $s_i \in S^1$

Dominant strategies

Even better:

• <u>Definition</u>: A strategy s_i of pl. 1 is *strictly dominant* if $u_1(s_i, t_j) > u_1(s', t_j)$


for every strategy $s' \in S^1$ and every strategy $t_j \in S^2$

- Similarly for pl. 2
- In prisoner's dilemma, strategy C (confess) is strictly dominant
 Observations:
- There may be more than one dominant strategies for a player, but then they should yield the same utility under all profiles
- Every player can have at most one strictly dominant strategy
- A strictly dominant strategy is also dominant

Existence of dominant strategies

- Few games possess dominant strategies
- It may be too much to ask for
- E.g. in the Bach-or-Stravinsky game, there is no dominant strategy:
 - Strategy B is not dominant for pl. 1:
 If pl. 2 chooses S, pl. 1 should choose S
 - Strategy S is also not dominant for pl. 1:
 If pl. 2 chooses B, pl. 1 should choose B
- In all the examples we have seen so far, only prisoner's dilemma possesses dominant strategies

	(C)	
B		S



Back to choosing a strategy...

- Hence, the question of how to choose strategies still remains for the majority of games
- Model of rational choice: if a player knows or has a strong belief for the choice of the other player, then he should choose the strategy that maximizes his utility
- Suppose that someone suggests to the 2 players the strategy profile (s, t)
- When would the players be willing to follow this profile?
 - For pl. 1 to agree, it should hold that

 $u_1(s, t) \ge u_1(s', t)$ for every other strategy s' of pl. 1


- For pl. 2 to agree, it should hold that

 $u_2(s, t) \ge u_2(s, t')$ for every other strategy t' of pl. 2

Nash Equilibria



- <u>Definition (Nash 1950)</u>: A strategy profile (s, t) is a Nash equilibrium, if no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate, given the other player's choice
- This means that the following conditions should be satisfied:
 - 1. $u_1(s, t) \ge u_1(s', t)$ for every strategy $s' \in S^1$
 - 2. $u_2(s, t) \ge u_2(s, t')$ for every strategy $t' \in S^2$
- One of the dominant concepts in game theory from 1950s till now
- Most other concepts in noncooperative game theory are variations/extensions/generalizations of Nash equilibria



In order for (s, t) to be a Nash equilibrium:

- x must be greater than or equal to any x_i in column t
- y must be greater than or equal to any y_i in row s

Nash Equilibria

- We should think of Nash equilibria as "stable" profiles of a game
 - At an equilibrium, each player thinks that if the other player does not change her strategy, then he also does not want to change his own strategy
- Hence, no player would regret for his choice at an equilibrium profile (s, t)
 - If the profile (s, t) is realized, pl. 1 sees that he did the best possible, against strategy t of pl. 2,
 - Similarly, pl. 2 sees that she did the best possible against strategy s of pl. 1
- Attention: If both players decide to change simultaneously, then we may have profiles where they are both better off

• A set of **players**

- A set of **players**
- Each player has a set of possible strategies (actions)

- A set of **players**
- Each player has a set of possible **strategies** (actions)
- Each state of the game (defined by a strategy per player) yields a payoff (or utility) to each player

- A set of **players**
- Each player has a set of possible **strategies** (actions)
- Each state of the game (defined by a strategy per player) yields a payoff (or utility) to each player
- Given the strategies of the other players, each player aims to select its strategy in order to maximize its utility
 - Such a strategy is called a **best response**

- A set of **players**
- Each player has a set of possible **strategies** (actions)
- Each state of the game (defined by a strategy per player) yields a payoff (or utility) to each player
- Given the strategies of the other players, each player aims to select its strategy in order to maximize its utility
 - Such a strategy is called a **best response**
- A state consisting of best responses is stable, and called a pure Nash equilibrium: no player would like to deviate and select a different strategy

Examples of finding Nash equilibria in simple games

19

Example 1: Prisoner's Dilemma


 \Box

In small games, we can examine all possible profiles and check if they form an equilibrium


- (D, D): both players have an incentive to deviate to another strategy
- (C, D): pl. 1 has an incentive to deviate
- (D, C): Same for pl. 2
- (C, C): Nobody has an incentive to change

Hence: The profile (C, C) is the unique Nash equilibrium of this game

Recall that C is a dominant strategy for both players in this game
 Corollary: If s is a dominant strategy of pl. 1, and t is a dominant strategy for pl. 2, then the profile (s, t) is a Nash equilibrium




Example 2: Bach or Stravinsky (BoS)



2 Nash equilibria:

- (B, B) and (S, S)
- Both derive the same total utility (3 units)
- But each player has a preference for a different equilibrium

Example 2a: Coordination games



Again 2 Nash equilibria:

- (B, B) and (S, S)
- But now (B, B) is clearly the most preferable for both players
- Still the profile (S, S) is a valid equilibrium, no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate
 - At the profile (S, S), both players should deviate together in order to reach a better outcome

Example 3: The Hawk-Dove game




- The most fair solution (D, D) is not an equilibrium
- 2 Nash equilibria: (D, H), (H, D)
- We have a stable situation only when one population dominates or destroys the other


Example 4: Matching Pennies H T H 1, -1 -1, 1 T -1, 1 1, -1


- In every profile, some player has an incentive to deviate
- There is no Nash equilibrium!
- Note: The same is true for Rock-Paper-Scissors


Nash dynamics graph


- An easy way to graphically find Nash equilibria
- Built a graph containing a node per state
- A directed edge between two nodes represents the fact that there exists a player with a profitable unilateral deviation
- A node with only incoming edges corresponds to an equilibrium state: no player would like to deviate from there




























Chicken


		columr	column-driver		
		chicken	dare		
row-driver	chicken	0, 0	-1, 1		
row-driver	dare	1, -1	-10, -10		


Chicken






Chicken







Matching pennies



Matching pennies






Mixed strategies in games

Existence of Nash equilibria

- We saw that not all games possess Nash equilibria
- E.g. Matching Pennies, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and many others
- What would constitute a good solution in such games?

Example of a game without equilibria: Matching Pennies H T




- In every profile, some player has an incentive to change
- Hence, no Nash equilibrium!

Q: How would we play this game in practice?

A: Maybe randomly

Matching Pennies: Randomized strategies



- Main idea: Enlarge the strategy space so that players are allowed to play non-deterministically
- Suppose both players play
 - H with probability 1/2
 - T with probability 1/2
- Then every outcome has a probability of ¼
- For pl. 1:
 - $P[win] = P[lose] = \frac{1}{2}$
 - Average utility = 0
- Similarly for pl. 2

Mixed strategies

- <u>Definition</u>: A mixed strategy of a player is a probability distribution on the set of his available choices
- If S = (s₁, s₂,..., s_n) is the set of available strategies of a player, then a mixed strategy is a vector in the form
 p = (p₁, ..., p_n), where
 p_i ≥ 0 for i=1, ..., n, and p₁ + ... + p_n = 1
- p_i = probability for selecting the j-th strategy
- We can write it also as p_j=p(s_j) = prob/ty of selecting s_i
- Matching Pennies: the uniform distribution can be written as

p = (1/2, 1/2) or p(H) = p(T) = ½

Pure and mixed strategies

- From now on, we refer to the available choices of a player as *pure strategies* to distinguish them from mixed strategies
- For 2 players with $S^1 = \{s_1, s_2, ..., s_n\}$ and $S^2 = \{t_1, t_2, ..., t_m\}$
- Pl. 1 has n pure strategies, Pl. 2 has m pure strategies
- Every pure strategy can also be represented as a mixed strategy that gives probability 1 to only a single choice
- E.g., the pure strategy s₁ can also be written as the mixed strategy (1, 0, 0, ..., 0)
- More generally: strategy s_i can be written in vector form as the mixed strategy eⁱ = (0, 0, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0)
 - 1 at position i, 0 everywhere else
 - Some times, it is convenient in the analysis to use the vector form for a pure strategy

Utility under mixed strategies

- Suppose that each player has chosen a mixed strategy in a game
- How does a player now evaluate the outcome of a game?
- We will assume that each player cares for his expected utility
 - Justified when games are played repeatedly
 - Not justified for more risk-averse or risk-seeking players


Expected utility (for 2 players)

- Consider a n x m game
- Pure strategies of pl. 1: S¹ = {s₁, s₂,..., s_n}
- Pure strategies of pl. 2: S² = {t₁, t₂,..., t_m}
- Let $\mathbf{p} = (\mathbf{p}_1, ..., \mathbf{p}_n)$ be a mixed strategy of pl. 1 and $\mathbf{q} = (\mathbf{q}_1, ..., \mathbf{q}_m)$ be a mixed strategy of pl. 2
- Expected utility of pl. 1:

$$u_1(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m p_i \cdot q_j \cdot u_1(s_i, t_j) = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m p(s_i) \cdot q(t_j) \cdot u_1(s_i, t_j)$$

• Similarly for pl. 2 (replace u₁ by u₂)

Example



- Let p = (4/5, 1/5),
 q = (1/2, 1/2)
- u₁(p, q) = 4/5 x 1/2 x 2 + 1/5 x 1/2 x 1 = 0.9
- u₂(p, q) = 4/5 x 1/2 x 1 + 1/5 x 1/2 x 2 = 0.6
- When can we have an equilibrium with mixed strategies?

Nash equilibria with mixed strategies

- <u>Definition</u>: A profile of mixed strategies (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium if
 - $u_1(p, q) \ge u_1(p', q)$ for any other mixed strategy p' of pl. 1

 $- u_2(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) \ge u_2(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q'})$ for any other mixed strategy $\mathbf{q'}$ of pl. 2

- Again, we just demand that no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate to another strategy
- How do we verify that a profile is a Nash equilibrium?
 - There is an infinite number of mixed strategies!
 - Infeasible to check all these deviations

Nash equilibria with mixed strategies

- Corollary: It suffices to check only deviations to pure strategies
 - Because each mixed strategy is a convex combination of pure strategies
- <u>Equivalent definition</u>: A profile of mixed strategies (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium if
 - $u_1(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) \ge u_1(\mathbf{e}^i, \mathbf{q})$ for every pure strategy \mathbf{e}^i of pl. 1
 - $u_2(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) \ge u_2(\mathbf{p}, e^j)$ for every pure strategy e^j of pl. 2
- Hence, we only need to check n+m inequalities as in the case of pure equilibria

Mixed equilibria

• **Mixed equilibrium:** A profile of *mixed* strategies such that each player maximizes its expected utility, given the strategies of the other players

Mixed equilibria

• **Mixed equilibrium:** A profile of *mixed* strategies such that each player maximizes its expected utility, given the strategies of the other players

<u>Theorem</u> [Nash, 1951] Every finite strategic game of *n* players has at least one mixed equilibrium

Mixed equilibria

• **Mixed equilibrium:** A profile of *mixed* strategies such that each player maximizes its expected utility, given the strategies of the other players

<u>Theorem</u> [Nash, 1951] Every finite strategic game of *n* players has at least one mixed equilibrium

- Every pure equilibrium is also a mixed equilibrium
 - Every pure strategy can be seen as a probability distribution over all strategies that assigns probability 1 to this one pure strategy